Five big things you should know about Russia’s new foreign policy

Five big things you should know about Russia’s new foreign policy

Russian President Vladimir Putin, at a meeting with ambassadors and heads of diplomatic missions on July 1, clarified his concept of Moscow’s foreign policy. The Ukrainian crisis is not the game-changer it was thought to be, and Putin’s bets are still on Europe rather than Asia.

The priorities of Russian foreign policy over the coming two years

Traditionally held every two years, the Russian president’s meeting with ambassadors and heads of diplomatic missions plays an important role in determining the priorities of Russia’s diplomatic corps and its entire foreign policy community.

Unlike other larger doctrinal documents, such as the Foreign Policy Concept or theAddress to the Federal Assembly, the president’s speech to diplomats is less formal in nature and contains a number of instructions on where the focus of foreign policy should be.

This year, Putin’s address to the ambassadors was the first comprehensive overview of the Kremlin’s foreign policy strategy and tactics since the Ukrainian crisis entered the “hot phase,” which, of course, made the president’s words all the more relevant.

The speech did indeed give serious food for thought.

Idea #1: Russia and Europe need each other, but the US is destabilizing their relationship

First of all, it is important to state that the president’s address debunked развенчаны the popularly held myth that, if the president’s words are to be taken literally, the events in Crimeaallegedly caused Russia to “turn its back on the West and face the East.”

Unlike Putin’s previous such address in 2012, when relations with Europe and the U.S. were placed last among regional priorities (with China taking second position after the Customs Union), in 2014 it was not China, but Europe that made a remarkable leap upwards, described as “a priority and vitally important partner,” second in importance only to the countries of the Eurasian Economic Union.

China was mentioned only after Europe, and in the relevant section Putin reflected not so much on China, but on the fact that Moscow’s friendship with Beijing should not threaten Russia's relations with other Asia-Pacific countries – Vietnam, India, Japan – which are known to be increasingly disconcerted about China’s assertive напористый foreign policy.

Putin devoted almost half the time to various aspects of relations with Europe, with no negative connotations whatsoever. The essence of this idea is that Russia is part of Europe; Russia and Europe need each other to achieve stability and prosperity, but normal relations between the two are being destabilized by U.S. policy. The task of Russian diplomacy is to help Europe free itself of this external pressure and open up new prospects for cooperation.

Idea #2: There is no imminent неизбежный warming of relations between Russia and the US

Very regrettably for those who still cling to the hope of a speedy normalization of Russian-U.S. relations, it seems that Putin is finally and firmly convinced that the root of all ills in the present international system – from Iraq to Ukraine – lies in Washington’s foreign policy.

Even an often quoted phrase from Putin’s speech (“We are not going to close the door on relations with the United States”) gives optimists little hope. From his address, it is clear that Putin places the blame for the crisis in relations squarely прямо on the U.S. There will be no reciprocal steps from Moscow until Washington radically reframes its policy.

Idea #3: Russia is preparing for a major foreign policy offensive наступление

So what did the Russian president propose to bring the situation in Ukraine, Europe, and wider (“from Lisbon to Vladivostok”) back into the realm область of normalcy?

Here is a direct quote: “We must persevere to rid Europe of anti-constitutional coups перевороты, interventions in the internal affairs of sovereign states, blackmail and threats in international relations, and the inducement побуждение of radical and neo-Nazi forces. All of us in Europe need some kind of safety net to prevent the Iraqi, Libyan, Syrian, and, I am sorry to say in this context, Ukrainian precedents from becoming contagious.”

Idea #4: Wager ставка on European anti-Americanism

The ideas voiced by Putin on July 1 significantly clarified his stance on foreign policy.

Importantly, the Ukrainian crisis did not turn these concepts on their head, as the inexperienced observer might be prone склонны to think, but merely underscored подчеркнул the long-emerging areas of focus.

And the most important conclusion is that Putin, despite everything, has no intention of breaking with his pro-Western orientation; the first bet is still on Europe, not Asia.

In the context of what it perceives as the creation of a broad international anti-Russian front, which includes a number of European countries, Russia’s chosen strategy is to split the ranks of the “enemy,” which the Kremlin hopes to achieve by separating the “good” Europe from the “bad” U.S.

In his speech, Putin expressed particular outrage at U.S. sanctions against French banks, playing on France’s renowned anti-Americanism.

Idea #5: Moral superiority as the basis of Russian foreign policy

But what, other than sympathy, can Russia utilize to entice Europe into a new “Holy Alliance”?

After Crimea, slogans about respect for international law (which the U.S. flouts) are hardly going to win over European leaders.

Putin voiced a few formulas that certainly have tremendous огромный persuasive power – but, once again, mainly in Russia, not beyond.

To begin with, the Russian president spoke of “non-compliance with standards of decency порядочность” by some international players, clearly hinting at the U.S. The phrase “standards of decency” stands out as something more substantial and primary than international law.

In the concluding part of his speech, Putin appealed to “truth, justice, and the power of moral superiority,” describing them as the real basis of Russian foreign policy.

One can agree that the success or failure of Putin’s foreign policy program, as proclaimed on July 1, will be determined by the extent to which the categories of truth and justice, well understood and close to the Russian public, are communicated to foreign audiences by Russian diplomats, politicians, and journalists.

However, that is not all that is required for a favorable outcome. The next round of events will demonstrate how effective it is to wager on European anti-Americanism at a time when the U.S. is not sitting with arms folded, but developing its own projects to strengthen ties with Europe.